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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
By OLIVER A. RICE*
The discussion of the cases dealing with the problems of municipal
corporations during the survey period will be undertaken schematically
rather than chronologically. An effort will be made to effect that classification of the cases which, with the practicing attorney's background of experience, will enable him most easily to fit these new pronouncements of
the Georgia appellate courts into the body of Georgia law.
The liability of a municipal corporation for tort occasioned by, or nuisance created through the acts of municipal agents, acting in the scope
and course of their employment, is ever a perplexing one, due to the practical difficulty of distinguishing between sovereign and proprietary function. The deceptively simple rule as to municipal liability for tort has been
stated in Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Jordan:'
" . . . Where the municipality undertakes to perform for the state duties
which the state itself might perform, but which have been delegated to the
municipality-such for instance as devolve upon the board of health of a city
under its charter, for the protection of life, health and comfort of the community-and in the exercise of such function under the department a private
citizen is injured by the negligence of the servants of the department while
engaged in such work, no cause of action arises against such municipality. On
the other hand, a municipality is civilly liable for damages arising 'for negli•gence to perform, or for improper or unskillful performance of their duties.'
(Civil Code 1910, § 897), or for acts which are thus performed in its private
character for business purposes, and for its own advantage and profit, although
such act may inure to the ultimate benefit of the citizen."

This rule throughout the country has proved most difficult in application to the varying factual situations to which it is nominally applicable.
When consideration is directed to the myriad vires activities of the municipal corporation of today, it is not surprising that contradictory results have2

been reached, not only interjurisdictionally, but even intrajurisdictionally.
In a recent case the Court of Appeals felt called upon to certify a question
to the Supreme Court on the point, which question the Supreme Court, in
City Council of Augusta v. JJWilliarns,3 answered by saying, "the authorized
maintenance by a municipality of a drainage system for purposes of drainage of surface water, as distinguished from a drainage system for purposes
of handling sewage, is a governmental function rather than a ministerial
function."
This certified question to the Supreme Court came to that body to resolve a doubt in the mind of the Court of Appeals which arose from the
facts in City Council of Augusta v. J4Jilliams,4 wherein the plaintiff sued
the city for its negligence in failing to maintain its sewage drainage system

1.
2.
3.
4.

*Assistant Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University;
A.B., 1933, LL.B., 1935, University of South Carolina; Member South Carolina and
Georgia Bar Associations.
142 Ga. 409, 83 S.E. 109 (1914).
See Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610, 120 A.L.R. 1368 (1939).
206 Ga. 558, 57 S.E.2d 593 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 132, 58 S.E.2d 208 (1950).
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in proper working order to carry off surface water, so that, during a normal
rainfall, surface water was caused to flow upon the premises of the plaintiff and injure his property.
The court held that: "since the function of maintaining a drainage system is governmental, at least in this case, in view of the answer to the
certified question, and no nuisance is involved, the ruling in Foster v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, 77 Ga. App. 346, 48 S. E. 2d
686, and cases cited therein are controlling. The court erred in overruling
*thegeneral demurrer to plaintiff's petition." ' 5 [Emphasis supplied.]
proprietary function in its bearing on municipal liability for tort.

The reason back of the emphasized clause in the above quotation is
shown in Cannon v. City of Macon.6 In that case an action was brought
for damages sustained to the home of the plaintiff from water damage
caused by the overflow of a city storm sewer. It was alleged that the
overflow was caused by the acts of the city in overburdening the sewer
with tributary drains from nearby streets, newly paved by the city, of which
overburdened condition the city had notice. Plaintiff's house was rendered
unsafe by the collapse of the earth under it, and a collection of stagnant
water on her premises furnished a breeding ground for mosquitoes, dangerous to both the life and safety of the plaintiff and her family. Plaintiff
alleged consequent loss of market value of her premises and that the
overflow constituted a nuisance and trespass on her property all of which
was caused by the city's negligent failure to keep the drain in repair and
supply adequate drainage.
The court stated the principle that in the case of an injury based on
negligence alone on the part of a municipal corporation in the exercise of,
or failure to perform, a governmental function, the resulting damage is
damnum absque injuria because the hurt is without redress. But, it pointed
out that the rule is different in the case of a nuisance, even one created in
the performance of a governmental function, and cited City of Macon v.
Roy,7 to exemplify the rule that, even in the exercise of governmental powers, municipalities are liable to private citizens for the maintenance of a
nuisance and that negligence is not a necessary ingredient of a cause of
action growing out of a nuisance. The court concluded that the allegations
of the petition brought the case within the rule of municipal liability for
creating and maintaining a nuisance.
It is to be noted that a variant of the rule obtains in the matter of a
municipality's liability for injury resulting from a defect in its streets, roads
or bridges:
"It [the municipality] is not liable for acts performed in its legislative or
governmental capacity, but it may be held liable for injuries resulting from
ministerialacts relating to the improvement and maintenance of public streets
...A municipality acts ministerially in constructing and repairing public improvements or work, hence is liable to persons injured by negligence in the
performance of such corporate duties, as contradistinguished from public or
governmental, and this is true notwithstanding the improvements are presumed
a public benefit."8 [Emphasis supplied.]
5. The Foster case has a good discussion of the distinction between sovereign and
6. 81 Ga. App. 310, 58 S.E.2d 563 (1950).
7. 34 Ga. App. 603, 130 S.E. 700 (1925).
8. 6 MCQUrLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 1 2805 (2d ed. 1928).
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The principle is codified in Georgia" thusly: "If a municipal corporation
has not been negligent in constructing or repairing the same [i.e., streets],
it is not liable for injuries resulting from defects in its streets when it has
no actual notice thereof, or such defect has existed for a sufficient length
of time for notice to be inferred."
In this connection, the case of Battle v. City of Macon"0 involved a suit
against the city for damages allegedly sustained when the plaintiff's automobile ran into a hole and exposed sewer pipe in the street caused by "dirt
washing away from over and around said sewer pipe." The declaration
averred that the city knew, or should have known, of the existence of the
pipe, and that the surrounding dirt had, or would, wash away. On the
question of the sufficiency of the declaration, brought to test by general
demurrer, the Court of Appeals said the demurrer was based on Code
Section 69-303 which codifies the rule of Mayor, etc. of the City of Montczuma v. WJilson," which case held that a municipality is not liable for damages occurring by reason of defects in streets, sidewalks, sewers or bridges
when it has no notice thereof, or when such defect has not existed long
enough to raise an inference of notice, provided the corporation has not
been negligent in constructing or repairing the same. This, said the court,
does not mean that the facts constituting the constructive notice must be
alleged in the petition. Plaintiff's allegation that the city "knew or should
have known" of the alleged defect was thus a sufficient allegation of constructive notice. The city contended that the plaintiff's allegations that
it was raining at the time of his accident and that the hole was caused by
dirt washing away from over and around the sewer, taken together,
amounted to an admission that the hazardous condition had been caused
by that particular rain, and, consequently, that the city had not had time
to receive notice of the condition of the street. The court said, in effect,
that such argument was a non sequitur, and pointed out that the allegation
-was inserted in the declaration to negative negligence on the part of the
plaintiff.
The case of Collier v. Cobb County,' 2 is to the same effect, the Court of
Appeals holding that in an action for damages occasioned by a defective
bridge upon which the plaintiff drove his car, the superior court correctly
charged the jury: that proper county authorities are under a duty to construct and maintain bridges in a workmanlike and proper manner, so that
they can be safely used in ordinary travel; that this duty is not one of extraordinary care and diligence; that county authorities are not insurers of
those who use bridges; and that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover unless the county authorities knew of the defects in the bridge, or
unless they had existed for so long that knowledge thereof by the county
authorities would be presumed. Also, it was declared that the superior
court had correctly declined to furnish a "yardstick" for the determination
of the length of time requisite to raise the presumption of knowledge, for
any attempt to do so would be an invasion of the province of the jury as
to a question of fact.
9.
10.
11.
12.

GA. CODE § 69-303 (1933).
81 Ga. App. 388, 59 S.E.2d 5 (1950).
82 Ga. 206, 9 S.E. 17, 14 Am. St. Rep. 150 (1889).
81 Ga. App. 712, 59 S.E.2d 672 (1950).
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The facts alleged in the case of City of Dalton v. Cochran'" were that
the plaintiff's motorcycle struck a hole in a street, overturned and injured
him. It appeared that there were several holes in the street at that point,
that a pedestrian had previously been injured by stepping into one of them,
and that complaints as to the condition of the street had been made to
the superintendent of streets and a member of the city council two or
three weeks before the accident. The court held: "As to the general demurrer, the allegations of the petition regarding the nature of the defect,
the length of time it had been in existence, the knowledge thereof on the
part of the governing authorities and their failure to repair; together
with the necessary allegations as to damages were sufficient to raise a jury
issue as to whether there had in fact been actionable negligence on the part
of the city."
To like effect is Grady County v. Banker," wherein it appeared a county

bridge had been swept away by flood and replaced by a portable bridge
with an approach ramp at either end. Plaintiff, a stranger to the community, approached the bridge by car, obeyed a "slow" sign by abating his
speed to 40 m.p.h., noted a second sign saying "narrow" or "one way
bridge," looked onto the bridge and saw no oncoming traffic; and it was
not until then that he saw the steep ramps, which, as he passed over them,
caused his car to bounce, its tires to burst, and himself to lose control of
the car, whereby he and the car were injured.
The court held that a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff was not error, saying that although the law does not make county authorities insurers
of those who use county bridges, and although the county was under no
duty to post warning, signs at bridges other than the ones shown, or indeed
any signs at all, the jury was authorized to find under the facts that the
bridge was unsafe for ordinary travel, and that its perilous condition was
not obvious enough from a distance to give the plaintiff timely notice thereof.
Problems relating to the establishment, control and abandonment of
public streets and roads within the corporate bounds of municipal and
quasi-municipal corporations have received their due of attention in the
Georgia cases lately. In Garnerv. Mayor and Council of 4thens" the re-

ported facts are that the plaintiff Garner leased certain lands to the plaintiff Flying Service for the operation of a flying field thereon. Subsequently,
the city undertook to grade a street on the property, which grading would
destroy the runway in use for airplanes. Whereupon the lessor and
lessee sued to enjoin the city and its servants from grading the street.
The defendant city's answer and proof made it appear that along the
course of the proposed grading there had been a public way since 1920,
when the corporate limits of the city were extended to include it, at which
time the city "tacitly" accepted the road as a public street. The city, therefore, contended that the plaintiffs' use of the street as a runway was an unlawful obstruction of a street, and prayed that the plaintiffs be enjoined
from so doing. The court held that a public way can come into existence b)
13. 80 Ga. App. 252, 55 S.E.2d 907 (1949).
14. 81 Ga. App. 701, 59 S.E.2d 732 (1950).
15. 206 Ga. 815, 58 S.E.2d 844 (1950).
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condemnation, by grant, by prescription or by dedication. It found in the
record neither evidence nor contention that the county acquired any title
to the way as a public road by condemnation or grant. Also absent was
evidence that the defendant had worked or improved the road since it
had been taken into the city limits in 192o. The court conceded that the
evidence showed a way did exist and was used to some extent at some time
in the past, but that such use was partial and desultory and not the continuous and total use which would be capable of ripening into title. The
city cannot, it was said, show a dedication, for there is no real evidence of
an intention on the part of the owner to dedicate the property to the public
use, nor of any public acceptance of the property for such use.
The case of City of Atlanta v. Murphy6 involves the right of municipalities, under certain circumstances, to close and abandon a part of a state
highway. The Commissioner of Roads and Revenues of Clayton County
had consented to the closing and abandonment of about 1,400 feet of a
state highway to permit the extension of the Atlanta Municipal Airport.
In consideration therefor, the City of Atlanta agreed to bear some part
of the expense of providing an alternate route for that portion of the highway utilized, which alternate, the plaintiffs claim, would be "circuitous and
impracticable," and too narrow for the volume of traffic in the vicinity.
The State Highway Department started building the alternate route
preparatory to closing part of the highway; whereupon the plaintiffs, residents and taxpayers, brought action against the Commissioner of Roads
and Revenues of Clayton County, the State Highway Department and the
City of Atlanta to enjoin them from abandoning, closing and altering the
highway. The Supreme Court said that broad and comprehensive power
was conferred upon municipalities, counties and other political subdivisions
to acquire lands for the 'Construction and expansion of airports by The Uniform Airports Law," and found under Howard v. City of Atlanta8 full
authority vested in the city and the other defendants to contract for the
closing and relocation of part of the state highway to expand the municipal
airport. It was held that no arbitrary abuse of powers conferred by the
Uniform Airports Law was shown.
The writer's plan of presentation next requires an examination of Story
v. City of Macon." As a preliminary to such consideration, attention is directed to Code Section 69-403 which provides that improvements of public
streets, in municipalities having a population of six hundred or more, may
be initiated either by publication of a resolution of necessity by the governing body (i.e., of the city) or by a petition of the owners of a majority of
the lineal feet of frontage on the land liable to assessment for the improvement. In the former case, if the owners of a majority of the lineal frontage
on lands abutting the improvement do not file a written protest within fifteen days after the last day of publication of the council's resolution, the
governing body shall have the power to cause such improvement to be
made. In the later case, it shall be the duty of the governing body tomake
16.
17.
18.
19.

206
GA.
190
205

Ga. 21, 55 S.E.2d 573 (1950).
CODE ANN. § 11-2 (Supp. 1947).
Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940).
Ga. 590, 54 S.E.2d 396 (1949).
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the improvement and the before-mentioned resolution shall not be required.
In the Story case a majority of property owners abutting a narrow, littletraveled, dead-end street instituted a petition to have it paved. That petition was either withdrawn or not acted upon by the city council, and some
of its signatories asked that their names be stricken from it, apparently
with the result that the remaining signatures represented the ownership of
less than a majority of the lineal feet of frontage on the avenue. Subsequently, the council enacted an ordinance condemning this street for paving,
and giving the city engineer power and discretion as to the paving, according to plans and specifications, and further providing (in accord with an
ordinance passed pursuant to charter authority to council to prescribe
how owners or agents shall be served with notice of the city's intention
to pave a street by personal service or publication) that notice of the city's
intention to pave the street be published at least twice before the work
should be commenced. A resolution was then passed that the mayor and
council should proceed with the project. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the city
from paving the street. They contended: that there was no public need for
the paving; that the action of the council was arbitrary and an abuse of
discretion; that the provisions of Code Section 69-403 were not being carried out, as a majority of contiguous owners then opposed the project; and
that if the petitioners' properties were subjected to levy and sale under
void paving assessments, such act would violate the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution. The court held that the due notice required by the charter and the ordinance gave the interested property owners
a chance to protest the project, and that there was no want of due process
in the proceedings. Whether or not the project was advisable or necessary
was a matter for the discretion of the council by charter provision. Council's motives are not subject to inquiry, and there was no showing of abuse
of discretion. The contention that the ordinance providing for the paving was void as a delegation of the council's legislative duties to the city engineer and to the street committee of the council is without merit. The
charter gives the mayor and council broad powers in relation to street paving, but does not require them to make plans and specifications for the paving as did the charter in WJlatson v. Bryant."
In City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co.2" the question involved
was to what extent, if any, the city could interfere with the Georgia Power Company's exercise of a franchise to use the city streets, which franchise had been granted some twenty years previously pursuant to a publication of application that was not in strict conformity with statute. The
Supreme Court gave opinion that a franchise to use city streets granted by
a city council acting in conformity with statutory authority is a binding
contract, entitled to the protection of the impairment of contract clause of
the federal Constitution; and that the city was equitably estopped to take
advantage of the defect in the publication of application, since the city had
the power to give such a franchise, had undertaken to do so and had stood
20. 37 Ga. App. 768, 141 S.E. 920 (1927).
21. 205 Ga. 843, 55 S.E.2d 540 (1949).
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by for twenty years permitting the Power Company to invest large sums
of money.
The right of a municipal corporation, under its police powers, to make
reasonable regulations of the use of the public streets in behalf of the public safety and convenience is well-established. With each novel approach
to the exercise of such control has come a flurry of objection addressed to
the supposed unreasonableness of the machanics of the approach. It is now
rather generally recognized by the courts that municipalities, in the ordinary exercise of the right to control the streets in the public interest, may
install parking meters wherever it is reasonably necessary for control of
the flow of traffic, with the proviso that in states which have a constitutional prohibition against the use of the licensing power for revenue purposes,
the parking fee must be reasonably condign to the cost of administering the
meter system. In Jshley v. City of Greensboro 2 the city enacted an ordinance which, by way of inducement, stated that trafic in parts of the city
was impeded because of narrow streets, that motorists tended to park for
protracted periods, that there was a paucity of policemen available to control traffic in congested areas, and that the resultant conditions were perilous
to the life and property of motorists and pedestrians alike. Therefore, it
was ordained that certain streets (including the street on which the plaintiff's property abutted) be declared "congested"; and the police were directed to designate individual parking spaces within the congested areas
where parking meters would be installed. Penalties were provided for violation, and a parking meter company was authorized to install meters at the
indicated places. The plaintiff brought an action against the city and the
parking meter company to enjoin the further operation of the meters,
to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional as discrimnatory, and to
have the parking meter contracts between the defendants declared void.
The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the city's charter which
confer on it governmental power to regulate traffic and the parking of vehicles on its streets give authority to the city to limit the time of parking
by parking meters, and to collect such a charge for parking as serves to
regulate it and to defray the expense incident to the system. In order to
establish that a parking meter ordinance is a revenue measure (and thus
invalid as a tax under the guise of a police regulation), the court explained,
it must be shown that the scheme of the ordinance will result in a continuous
in-take of money substantially in excess of the cost of installation, maintenance and regulation. Plaintiffs alleged that the meters produced a deficit
for the city. "But the lack of profit from the operation of parking meters is
not a valid reason for their removal at the suit of citizens and tax paymunicipal authorities have the power to do
\
ers," said the court. 3" When
a discretionary act, the courts will not interfere with that discretion unless
it is arbitrarily exercised, and the presumption is in favor of a reasonable exercise of discretion. The point was made by the court that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of an ordinance is a question for the court
unless the resolution of that question depends on a matter of disputed fact.
22. 206 Ga. 800, 58 S.E.2d 815 (1950).
23. Indeed, it would seem directly to refute the allegation that the ordinance was a
revenue measure.
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Finally, the court said that the ordinance showed no discrimination
against the petitioners in favor of persons in a similar situation, and that
the contention that the ordinance deprived them of property without due
process and denied them equal protection was without merit. Nor did
the record show that the reasonable ordinance (so declared to be) had
been unreasonably administered. The lower court was thus justified in sustaining the city's general demurrer to the petition.
As was pointed out in the Ashley case, a municipality has no power to
impose a revenue tax under the guise of a police regulation. In PublixLucas Theatres v. City of Brunswick24 the city charter provided authority
for the imposition of occupation taxes and license fees. Pursuant thereto,
an ordinance imposed a "license or business tax to be paid for the privilege
of pursuing said business." Plaintiffs, in the early part of 1949, paid the
imposition for the year 1949 under that ordinance. Then the city ordained
that those in the entertainment business should pay an occupational tax,
percentage-wise, on their gross receipts according to the price of admission
charged. Plaintiffs brought an action to restrain the city from enforcing
the second ordinance. The court held that municipal corporations cannot
levy a tax on residents or property in the corporate limits unless the power
to do so is plainly and unmistakably conferred by statute. The legislature
may empower a city to levy a license tax and an occupation and property
tax on business, but the city can levy only one license or occupation tax on
a business for the taxable period.
A license is a right to do an act which would otherwise be illegal, explained the court, whereas a license fee is imposed to defray the expense
of administration of the machinery of imposition, and to regulate the business. An occupation tax, on the other hand, is imposed for the purpose of
raising revenue. Examining the ordinances here involved, and construing
them most strongly against the taxing power, it appears that both of the
impositions are in the nature of occupation taxes. "Since one occupation
tax had been demanded of plaintiffs . . . the City of Brunswick was with-

out authority to levy another and different occupation tax for the period
in Question."
The court distinguished between a tax for revenue and a regulatory imposition in Chandler v. City of Tifton,"5 and held that the validity of the
former depends upon its reasonableness. The reportecd facts show that
in 1948 the city enacted an ordinance to regulate certain kinds of businesses
and occupations, to fix the amount of tax and to provid penalties for violations of the ordinance. The ordinance provided for. an annual tax in
the amount of $25o.00 on the retail sale of wine. On February 7, 1949,
the city passed a license ordinance forbidding the issuance of licenses for
the sale of wine. On April 7, 1949, the ordinance was amended to provide
for an annual license of $5,ooo.oo for the retail sale of wine in the city.
The plaintiff sued to restrain the city, its recorder and its chief of police
from arresting or making cases against him for the sale of wine and from
trying him in police or recorder's court, and to have the ordinance declared
void and unconstitutional on the ground that it was arbitrary, unreasonable,
24. 206 Ga. 206, 56 S.E.2d 254 (1949).
25. 206 Ga. 43, 55 S.E.2d 568 (1949).
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confiscatory and violative of the due process clauses of the Federal and
State Constitutions.
The Supreme Court pointed out that the Act of 1935,26 as amended in
1941, 2 legalized the retail sale of wine in any county of the state unless
prohibited by election pursuant to the act as amended in 193728 and 1947.29

Since the business is licit, the city cannot arbitrarily prohibit the retail sale
of wine. "Bearing in mind," said the court, "that the ordinance was enacted
to raise revenue and not as a regulatory measure under the police powers,
the assessment of an annual license tax of $5,ooo in a community of about
i5,ooo people on a business which grossed $i5,ooo to $i8,ooo a year,
when other and larger communities levy a tax of only $75.00 to $100.00,

was unreasonable." The court noted that there was evidence in the record
to show that the plaintiff's business was in need of regulation, but that the
city wvas assuming to act under its taxing rather than its police powers.
As a general rule equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution unless
the prosecution threatens irreparable injury or destruction of property.
During the first part of 1949, the chief of police made many separate cases
against an employee of the plaintiff and threatened to make a separate
case for each future sale of wine, and the chief of police stated his intention to run the plaintiff out of business. This brings the case within the
exception.
The case of City of Griffin v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. of
Griffin30 posed the question of the right of a city to impose a $15o
license fee on a savings and loan association in view of Code Section
16-427, which forbids the state or any political subdivision thereof to tax
such an association on its franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, loans, shares
or accounts. The question was whether the license tax imposed by the city
was a tax on franchise within the words of the statute. The matter was
heard by both divisions of the Court of Appeals, and it was decided on
behalf of the majority that a franchise is the privilege of doing something
which the country at large has no right to do. Savings and loan associations, not being given the right of special use of public property, have no
franchise in that sense, so the legislature must have used the term in its
more popular sense of "license." The conclusion drawn was that the city
could not impose this tax on the savings and loan association.
In Davis v. City of Atlanta3' the municipality levied ad valorem taxes
on the property of certain wholesale produce dealers doing business as
the Georgia State Farmers' Market. They brought an equitable petition
to enjoin the collection of these taxes, alleging they were a part of the
State Market created and operated by the State of Georgia through its
Commissioner of Agriculture and that the Market was an agency of the
state performing governmental functions, which functions the city had no
right to impair by taxation. The court cited Board of Trustees v. City of
Atlanta,32 which case involved a legislative act declaring armory property
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ga. Laws 1935, p. 492.
Ga. Laws 1941, p. 234.
Ga. Laws 1937, p. 851.
Ga. Laws 1947, p. 1178.
80 Ga. App. 217, 55 S.E.2d 771 (1949).
206 Ga. 652, 58 S.E.2d 140 (1950).
113 Ga. 883, 39 S.E. 394, 54 L.R.A. 806 (1901).
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to be public property exempt from taxation. It was there held that the act
was unconstitutional because the exclusive use of private property for a
public purpose does not convert it into public property, nor did the legislative declaration have such effect. The court then noted Newton v. City
3 which was cited
of tlanta,"
for the proposition that the city had no power to impose an occupational tax on fruit and produce dealers conducting
their business exclusively through the facilities of the Georgia State Farmers' Market, even though such business were for private gain, as the market
was government owned and an integral part of the governmental function.
The court distinguished the Newton case, saying it was predicated on the
fact that the tax imposed was not a property tax but a license tax, tantamount to taxing a person for working for the state. The rule of the
Armory Case was held as controlling the city's demurrer to the petition
was sustained.
The case of City of Griffin v. Southeastern Textile Co."d deals principally with administrative and review procedures in the matter of assessment of municipal taxes. There, it appeared that the city tax assessors
assessed taxes for the year 1948 on the defendant's building in the amount
of $43,500. Defendant appealed the assessment to the city's Board of
Commissioners who approved the same; he then appealed to the superior
court, where the issues were tried before a jury who were instructed by the
court that the trial there was de novo as to the propriety of the assessment.
The jury lowered the assessment to $33,500. The municipality appealed,
contending for the first time that the provision of the city's charter authorizing the procedure followed was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
held that such constitutional question could not be raised for the first time
on appeal, and transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. Judge Townsend determined that the municipal charter provided for appeals of assessments to the Superior Court of Spalding County, "such appeal shall be
disposed of in the Superior Court as other appeal cases." Manifestly, the
court said, "the General Assembly in providing that the appeal ...was to

be disposed of in the Superior Court as other appeal cases intended this
disposition to be in accord with Code § 6-5oi. '3
It is a recognized truism in the field of public law that the power to tax
for revenue may be exercised only for purposes that are public; and tax
collected money can only be spent for such purposes. The concept of what
is and what is not a public purpose, however, is an ever changing one. The
concept has steadily broadened, and many purposes which "in days of
yore" would never have been considered as public are now accepted as
such, almost without question, although there yet remains great divergence
of opinion on the application of the principle.36
33. 189 Ga. 441(6), 6 S.E.2d 61 (1939).
34. 79 Ga. App. 420, 53 S.E.2d 921 (1949).
35. "An appeal to the superior court is a de novo investigation. It brings up the whole
record from the court below, and all competent evidence shall be admissible on the
trial thereof, whether adduced on a former trial or not; either party is entitled to
be heard on the whole merits of the case."
36. As evidence of how great the divergence alluded to can be, see Ducey v. Inhabitants
of Town of Webster, 237 Mass. 497, 130 N.E. 53 (1921) and Standard Oil Co. v. City
of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N.W. 172 (1926).
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7 a resident of the town intervened
In Thigpin v. Town of Davisboro"
of
the state to validate ten negotiable
in
the
name
in an action brought
revenue certificates issued to finance an improvement in the town's waterworks system. The intervener objected that the town was not incorporated,
or if it were, it had no authority to maintain a waterworks system, that
notice of the proceedings as published was not signed by the Clerk of the
Superior Court, if at all, until the advertisement was completed, that the
proceedings amounted to an attempt to donate property in violation of
the State Constitution, 8 and that the effort to hypothecate the present
waterworks system, which amounts to a donation of public property, was
unconstitutional!"' The court pointed out that the issuance of revenue
anticipation certificates is provided for by the Constitution," pursuant to
the Revenue Certificate Law of 1937 as amended in 1939," and that the
certificates are made payable from revenue-producing facilities of the
issuing political subdivision and do not constitute debts, within the meaning of the Constitution, against the issuing subdivision. Code Section
87-8o3 (d)' provides that the issuing authority can pledge all or part of
the revenue from an undertaking to the punctual payment of the certificates
and the interest thereon. The revenue certificates, the court concluded,
"are to be issued under the authority and in accordance with the method
prescribed by the constitution and the laws incorporated therein by reference thereto." The court said that the trial court acted properly in taking
judicial notice of the fact of incorporation. The court saw no considerable defect in a possible failure of the clerk of court to sign the validation
proceedings, as all concerned took notice. Lastly, the court found in the
incorporation express authority to establish and maintain a system of
waterworks.
Christian, as Commissioner of Roads and Revenues of Catoosa County, contracted to buy from the United States a water-distribution system
and sanitary sewerage system for $io,ooo. The contract recited that the
county agreed to spend $5o,ooo to improve, extend and rehabilitate said
systems. Christian paid $io,ooo from the Catoosa County Water Revenue Certificates and Sinking Fund, and, by resolution, authorized the issuance and sale of water-revenue certificates to defray the expense of improvement and extension of the waterworks system. Plaintiffs, as citizens,
taxpayers and property owners, sued to enjoin Christian from so doing on
the ground that the proposed expenditures were not for such a debt as
the defendant had a right to levy taxes to pay, and that no election by the
people had authorized the creation of the debt. On these contentions the
court, in McCloy v. Christian,3 declared that the trial court was justified
is sustaining a demurrer to the petition, for mere apprehension of danger

37. 206 Ga. 505, 59 S.E.2d 522 (1950).
38. GA. CONST. Art VII, § 1, 12(1), GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5402(1)

(1948 Rev.), limiting
the purposes for which the legislature may delegate to counties the right to levy a
tax.
39. GA. CONST. Art. VII, § 3, 1 5, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5605 (1948 Rev.).
40. GA. CONST. Art. VII, § 7, 1 5, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-6005 (1948 Rev.).
41. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 87-801 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
42. GA. CODE ANN. § 87-803(d) (Supp. 1947).
43. 206 Ga. 590, 58 S.E.2d 171 (1950).
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of injury through a loss of public funds does not state a basis for injunctive
relief at the suit of a taxpayer. The petition did not allege that the defendant had bound the county for the expansion and improvement of the
waterworks system, that he had tried to pay for the same out of current
funds, or that he had levied or tried to levy taxes for such purpose. Nor,
said the court, had the defendant created a debt against the county by the
stipulation that it would spend $5o,ooo to extend and repair the system,
as it was not alleged that the contract was spread on the county records as
required to effectuate a binding contract against the county.4"
Next will be considered those decisions dealing with the right of municipalities to obtain, hold and control real property for municipal purposes.
In that connection it has already been seen that a municipality may acquire
a public street by condemnation, grant, prescription or dedication. 5 That
a city may also dedicate its lands for a certain public purpose so as to deprive itself of any right to force a discontinuance of such use is shown
by City of Ibbeville v. Jay, ex rel. Syrns.46 The court held therein that the
state or a political subdivision of the state may dedicate its lands to a
particular public purpose. As the court indicates, Code Section 69-602 expressly authorizes cities to dedicate lands they own, which are not dedicated
to another and inconsistent purpose, for playgrounds, recreation centers
and other recreational purposes. And Code Section 85-410 provides that
if the owner of lands dedicates such lands to public use, and they are used
for that purpose for such time that the public accommodation or private
rights might be materially affected by an interruption of the enjoyment,
he may not afterward appropriate it to private uses. The court cited
Macon v. Franklins7 to the effect that a dedication of land to a public use
is in the nature of an estoppel in pals, and an effort to revoke such dedication may be enjoined by anyone interested in the use. The court concluded
that the city's reservation of a right to maintain a water tank on the land
was not an antagonistic use, and did. not operate to show that there was
no dedication of the property to the public.
Tilnan v. Mayor, etc., of the City of Athens48 reaffirmed the principle
that when a municipality has acquired property for a specific public purpose,
it holds the property as trustee for the public in the furtherance of that
purpose, and may not put it to another use which would tend to exclude or
hamper the first.
During the survey period, three cases were considered by the appellate
courts concerning zoning and building regulations. They warrant the examination of the practitioner, as the field of zoning regulations is of comparatively recent development in the state; and these cases, apart from
their specific holdings, present a review of the development of applicable
Georgia law.
City of Pearson v. Glidden Co.49 presented this situation. Prior to the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See GA. CODE § 23-1701 (1933) and Killian v. Cherokee County, 169 Ga. 313, 150
S.E. 158 (1929).
Garner v. Mayor and Council of Athens, note 15 supra.
205 Ga. 743, 55 S.E.2d 129 (1949).
12 Ga.239 (1852).
206 Ga. 289, 56 S.E.2d 624 (1949).
205 Ga. 738, 55 S.E.2d 129 (1949).
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passage of the Constitution of I945,"° Georgia municipalities had no power
to enact zoning ordinances, except that the 1928 amendments to the Constitution of 1877 gave that power to specified cities of which the city of
Person was not one., On September ii, 1945, the city of Pearson attempted to enact a zoning ordinance. Still later, an act was passed giving
to municipalities the power to enact zoning ordinances." At a yet later
date, that is, on December io, 1946, the mayor and council of Pearson
ordained that it would be unlawful to erect any building in the city without
first obtaining the council's approval of the plans and specifications of the
proposed building. Plaintiff submitted to the council plans for a structure
he proposed to build. The council refused him a building permit; whereupon he brought mandamus, claiming that the zoning ordinance of September i i, 195o, was invalid for want of original authority and that his
plans complied with the building standards ordinance of December IO,
1946. The city contended that since the ordinance of December IO,1946,
( 3 the
was passed after the enactment of Code Sections 69-8oi et seq.,
council was within its rights in refusing a permit, and that mandamus would
not lie. The court answered this argument by pointing out that the ordinance of December io, 1946, was not a zoning ordinance but rather a means
of enforcing building standards, and that under such an ordinance, the applicant having complied therewith, the city authorities could not (had no
power to) refuse the permit unless the proposed structure were a nuisance
per se. Again, the city contended that since the plaintiff took the position
that the ordinances of September i i, 1945, and December IO,1946, were
void, he could not ask that the city be compelled to act under the ordinance
of December 1o, 1946. The court pointed out the obvious-that the plaintiff claimed the ordinance of September I I, 1945, was invalid and claimed
under the ordinance of December io, 1946.
The attention of the reader is now invited to Galfas v. Ailor, 4 wherein
the petitioner applied to the Board of Zoning Appeals of Atlanta for a
permit to erect a church building on a city lot for a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses. After a public hearing was held, the permit was denied.
The superior court sanctioned a writ of certiorari, which writ the court
dismissed on finding that the meetings of the congregation scheduled
throughout each week would cause parking congestion in the neighborhood
of the proposed church where parking space was already at a premium.
On appeal, opinion was given that under the Georgia Constitution and the
Enabling Act,55 Atlanta had broad power as to zoning and classifications,
which power might be exercised on any basis "relevant to the promotion of
the public health, safety, order, morals, convenience, prosperity or welfare." It was said that judgment as to the location of a church is vested
in the Board of Zoning Appeals; that the appellate court will not control
this discretion in the absence of manifest abuse; and that the record disclosed no such manifest abuse in the finding, under the facts adduced at the
50. See GA. CONST. Art. III, § 6, 123, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-1923 (1948 Rev.).
51. GA. CONST. Art. III, § 7, V25 (1877), GA. CODE § 2-1825 (1933).
52. Ga. Laws 1946, p. 191, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 69-801 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
53. Ibid.
54. 81 Ga. App. 13, 57 S.E.2d 834 (1950).
55. Ga. Laws 1929, pp. 818, 827.
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public hearing, that to permit the church to locate in the desired place
would create a traffic hazard.
Special attention should be directed at this time to Johnson v. Evangelical Church of the Messiah,5" lest a false impression be created by a decision
which, on analysis, appears to indicate a very sound distinction. Here, we
find a church applying to the commissioners of Decatur for an amendment
to a zoning ordinance, so as to permit a church to erect an edifice in a
residential district. Pursuant to the application, a public hearing was held.
Evidence was heard and the application was denied. Less than a month
later another application to the same effect was made and another public
hearing was called, at which a plea in bar was filed stating that since the
applicants had failed to apply for certiorari within the time limited by law,
no subsequent application could be heard. This question was reversed,
testimony was taken and the commissioners passed an amendment to the
zoning ordinance changing the classification of the premises from "residential" to "business," "to be used exclusively for the erection thereof of a
church or church buildings." Certain objectors to the re-zoning petitioned
for a writ of certiorari to review the action of the commissioners. The
Court of Appeals found in the Act of I92957 power granted to the Decatur
commissioners to adopt and enforce a zoning plan and to amend that plan
on proper notice from time to time as in their discretion might seem best,
with a right of review of every decision of the commissioners in the premises by writ of certiorari issued from the superior court "upon the same
terms as such writs are issued in any case." Therefore, the court concluded
that as the commissioners may re-zone -at any time so long as the conditions set forth in the act are observed, they may re-zone any application
after having refused a previous application to the same effect, even though
the proceeding for a re-zoning is quasi-judicial in that notice and hearing are. required before an application may be considered. The contention
that the act of the commissioners was in violation of certain sections of the
zoning ordinance was held to be without merit, as the action in re-zoning
was itself an amendment to the zoning ordinance.
Before attention is given to the special concurrence of Judge Felton, let
us consider the holding represented by the sentence italicized above. It
would be an act of supererogation to cite authority for the proposition
that a local legislative body may not delegate any part of its legislative discretion to any person or body of persons or corporations. By the same
token, a city council may not legislate beyond the sphere of the powers
granted it by the legislature. However, this constitutional principle is not
violated by an act of the legislature delegating local law-enacting powers to
any local body. Suppose the legislature created the municipal corporation
of X and provided in the act of incorporation that the power to enact
ordinances generally was in a council of five aldermen, but that the power
to enact a zoning ordinance was in the charge of a zoning committee of
five to be elected in a special election. Or, suppose the act of incorporation
provided for two councils, one to ordain in criminal and one to ordain in
56.
57.

79 Ga. App. 671, 54 S.E.2d 722 (1949).
Ga. Laws 1929, p. 1,021.
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civil matters. It can hardly be doubted that the legislature would have the
power so to do.58
To return to the principal case, Judge Felton concurred specially, saying that while each decision of the commission is quasi-judicial in a zoning
case, yet the legislature did not intend to preclude re-examination of any
such decision in case of a change in conditions, and that the petitioners
failed to show want of such change. He further pointed out the contentions of the petitioners that the commissioners could not, within the charter
and ordinances, treat a single lot as an "area," and that So per cent of an
area must petition for a change in zoning regulation as to such area, and
ruled thereon that everyone had had fair notice and that, at any rate, the
commission could have acted on its own motion without petition.
A matter of frequent concern to city officials, the general public and the
profession is the question of the right of a municipality to sell the products and services of its utilities, owned and maintained in either a sovereign
or proprietary capacity, outside the city limits. Certainly it would seem
that, in the proper and economical exercise of a clear right to have and
maintain such utilities, the city, if charter authority exist, may dispose of
that part of its products which is in excess of the present needs of the corporation. In the exercise of this right to dispose of excess utility products
and services outside the city limits, it has been held that the city does not
act as a public utility and may, therefore, fix the rates of such products and
services without reference to utility regulations. 9. The question then arises
may the municipality -,selling, say water, outside its limits bind itself by
contract to furnish the water at a standing rate? That and condign questions are interestingly presented in three cases, each entitled Bar v. City
Council of Augusta,0 in which the situation was that the City of. Augusta
contracted with the commissioners of Richmond County that a certain
sewage system would be made available to the general public of the county
under the same terms and conditions applicable to the city. Three years
later, the city council raised the water rates on persons outside the city and
laid an assessment of 30 per cent of the monthly water bill, under the new
rates, for the privilege of connecting or continuing connections with the
city sewage system outside the corporate limits of the city. Plaintiffs, residents of the Forest Hills section of the county, brought three actions: ( I )
to restrain the city from imposing the higher water rate, (2) to restrain
the city from imposing the sewage assessment, and (3) alleged the city was
acting in a proprietary capacity in operating its waterworks, and, even
without specific authority, was authorized to enter into valid and binding
contracts to furnish water at a reasonable rate. Plaintiffs alleged also that
the city was acting maliciously in retaliation for Forest Hill's refusing to
vote itself into the corporate limits of the city. Plaintiffs offered to pay such
rates as might be discovered against them in a determination of the proportionate cost of furnishing them service as against the cost of servicing the
city proper. On appeal, the court sustained demurrers to all three of the
petitions, finding as a matter of law that furnishing water and sewage dis58. See Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224, 2 L.R.A. 142 (1889).
59. Collier v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 575, 173 S.E. 853 (1933).
60. 206 Ga. 750, 753 and 756, 58 S.E.2d 820, 820 and 825 (1950).
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posal is a governmental function tied up with the public health; that a
municipal corporation has no power to make contracts restricting or limiting its legislative or governmental powers; that the city-county contract
in question was an attempt so to do, and as such was ultravires and void;
that since it was void, the city was not estopped to deny its validity; and
that if a municipal corporation chooses to extend its services in sovereign
function outside its corporate limits, it may classify its rates for such
service and stop service if those rates are not paid. And, finally, the business affairs of a municipality are the charge of the corporate authorities;
their discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of fraud;
and their motives are not a subject of judicial inquiry."'
An examination of municipal corporation cases going to appeal during
the survey year discloses eight of them dealing with the rights, duties and
liabilities of municipal officials and councilmen. Of this number, four involved questions of tenure and three involved the application of various
tenure acts. One, Story v. City of Macon,2 has already been noted
here in reference to street paving as a public necessity and the
proper method o f instituting such improvement under applicable
statutes. As far as that case is pertinent to the subject at hand, contention
was made by those opposing the paving project that the ordinance requiring the paving was invalid because one of the councilmen voting in its
favor owned property contiguous to the street to be paved and claimed a
violation of Code Section 69-204, providing: "It is improper and illegal
for a member of city council to vote on any question brought before the
council in which he is personally interested." The court held that ownership of property abutting a proposed improvement was not such personal
interest as the legislature had in mind.
Palmer v. Claxton6 3 presents the interesting question of the proper role
of a mayor in the election of city officials. Palmer was the clerk and treasurer of the town of Kite. When it came time for the mayor and council to
elect a clerk and treasurer for a new term, Claxton offered against Palmer.
At a special meeting of the council, at which five councilmen and the
mayor were present, three councilmen voted for Claxton and two for
Palmer. The mayor cast his vote for Palmer, creating a tie as he claimed,
and then cast his vote as presiding officer to break the tie and declared
Palmer elected. Claxton brought his petition, praying that the state's

writ of quo warranto be issued, that Palmer be ousted of office, and that
title to the office be declared in Claxton. The Supreme Court held: that
where a mayor is a member as well as the presiding officer of the council,
unless expressly forbidden, he, as a member, may cast a vote on all questions before the body; and where the charter or a valid rule of council
gives him a deciding vote in case of a tie, he may vote a second time. But,
where he is merely a presiding officer over and not a member of the counTo the effect that a city is bound by its contract to furnish outside its limits services
arising from a proprietary function, see Incorporated Town of Sibley v. Achiyedan
Electric Co., 194 Iowa 950, 187 N.W. 560 (1922).
62. 205 Ga. 590, 54 S.E.2d 396 (1949).
63. 206 Ga. 860, 59 S.E.2d 379 (1950, 2 MERCER L. REv. 282 (1950).
61.
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cil, his vote cannot be counted in the establishing of a majority nor can he
vote so as to create a tie and then cast the deciding vote.
Mathis v. Nelson" undertakes to answer the question of the liability of
a prison warden for the non-willful tort (negligence) of convicts while in
his presence and under his supervision and control. The Court of Appeals
points out that under the earlier case of Price v. Owen" such an officer
exercises cuasi-judicial powers and is consequently exempt from liability
for tort resulting from the exercise of his discretion, in the absence of willfulness, malice, fraud or corruption. The facts alleged in the Price case
were that the warden had permitted certain convicts in his charge to roam
the roads 'Without guards, that the convicts had become intoxicated and
had driven a county truck into the plaintiff's car. In the principal case, the
plaintiff's son had run into a county tractor which was being operated at
night without proper lights and on the left side of the road by convicts
under the supervision and control of the defendant warden. It was alleged
that a few moments before the accident, the defendant had passed by the
tractor and must have seen the unlighted condition and position of the
county equipment. The court distinguished the principal case from the Price
ease. The distinction seems to lie in this: The functions of an official are
quasi-judicial, and, in the exercise of them, the official is immune to suit
so long as he is exercising his discretion as to what is to be done and how
it is to be done; but, once he enters into the perpetration of the plan resulting from the exercise of his discretion, he is liable for any neglect in
the carrying out of that plan.
We turn now to Murphey v. Brock, " and see there that the members of
the board of county registrars of Walker County under Section 8 of the
Voter Registration Act 7 petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the
commissioner of roads to pay the petitioners for their services, performed
and to be performed, out of the cash basis in the hands of the defendant.
Defendant answered that the petitioners had overestimated the size and
the duration of the job in computing the value of their services. The court
held that while mandamus will lie to compel official acts when a duty to
charge them is clear, it will not lie to compel a general course of conduct
and the performance of continuous duties. So, mandamus will not lie to
compel payment for services to be performed and expenses to be incurred,
but it will lie to compel payment for services already performed and expenses already sustained.
As to the general right of a municipality to discharge public servants
and as to the safeguards surrounding that right for the protection of such
servants against oppression, see Stowers v City of Atlanta." The chief of
police charged policeman Jenkins with conduct unbecoming an officer. Jenkins was tried before the city's police commission, found guilty, and was
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided that the proceedings
before the police commission were quasi-judicial and its judgment was reviewable by writ of certiorari. There was sufficient competent evidence
64.
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in the record to justify the commission in finding Jenkins guilty and dismissing him.
The case of Albany v. Mitchell6 gives an insight into the problems of
municipal authorities when they undertake to discharge an employee.
Here, the plaintiff sued the city for back salary, and alleged that he had
been made a fireman of the city for a term fixed by the city charter. He
averred that before the end of his term he was discharged otherwise than
by the procedure set forth in the charter, in that no specific charges were
preferred against him; that no just cause for his removal was shown before
a proper tribunal empowered to hear such charges; that no public hearing
was afforded him; and that he had not been discharged or removed by a
majority vote of the commissioners as required by the city charter. The
city answered that the plaintiff was physically unable to perform his duties
and was insubordinate; that the chief of the fire department recommended
his discharge to the fire committee for these reasons; that on the committee's approval of the chief's proposal, the chief gave the plaintiff a
letter specifying the charges against him and notifying him of his dismissal; whereupon the plaintiff orally "quit"; that the chief had ordinanceconferred authority to accept resignations and did accept the plaintiff's
resignation; that later the plaintiff applied for reinstatement, was given
a public hearing and, after the chief had put in his evidence, withdrew his
request for reinstatement and resigned; that the plaintiff is barred by
estoppel, laches and waiver. The city also entered a general denial. On
demurrer to the city's answer, the court struck the entire answer except
the general denial. On appeal, the Court of Appeals said that the city was
entitled to plead a waiver by the plaintiff of his charter-conferred rights,
and was entitled to have a jury decide whether or not he had in fact waived
them. In like manner, the city was entitled to have the question of whether
or not the plaintiff was estopped to bring his action for back salary presented to a jury. As to laches, it is well-established in Georgia, said the court,
that the equitable doctrine of stale demand is not applicable to suits at
law. The lower court did not err in striking that part of the answer. Otherwise, the court erred.
Consideration will now be made of two Georgia cases arising under
local employees' tenure acts. In Stelling v. Richmond County"' the board
of county commissioners, in furtherance of statutory authority given them
to audit the books and accounts of the county and to delegate this power
to an expert accountant, hired the plaintiff on January I, 1935; and his appointment was duly entered on the minute books of the county. On January
13, 1947, he was informed that the position he held had been abolished, in
the interest of economy, as of January i. Plaintiff, in this action under
Richmond County's Officers' and Employees' Tenure Act,"' alleged that
his office had not been abolished; that someone else had been immediately
hired to perform the duties thereof at the same salary; that the recorded
abolition of the office was not bona fide, but was rather a subterfuge to
discharge him in violation of said act; and that he had made a continuing
offer of his services. He prayed for the recovery of two years' back salary
69. 81 Ga. App. 408, 59 S.E.2d 37 (1950).
70. 81 Ga. App. 571, 59 S.E.2d 414 (1950).
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and attorneys' fees. Defendant entered a general demurrer to the petition, which demurrer was sustained. The appellate court pointed out that
one theory of the demurrer was that the county had no authority to appoint an auditor and that the contract of his employment was not spread
on the county minutes, nor the copy and offer attached to the petition. The
court then indicated the statute which conferred the power on the board
to audit the books and employ an expert accountant for that purpose, and
said that when a statute-conferred power is delegated in accordance with
the details of the statute, a public office is thereby created although its
scope is limited. In special cases the passage of a resolution by the body
delegating the power in' accordance with the statute and the fixing of the
salary and the term of employment is sufficient, and no written contract
need be entered into, for the tenure act itself creates the contract and by
its terms brings in all persons employed by the county under the act after
they have served one year's probation, even though the temporal term of
the employment be indefinite. Nor, said the court, is this suit barred by
Code Section 23-16o6, requiring claims against counties to be presented
within one year for the purpose of special limits and to give counties a
chance to investigate the claims and make budgetary provision for them.
Obviously, these considerations do not apply to official salaries of which
the county is necessarily informed in advance. Plaintiff need not allege a
demand for hearing in this case, as when complaining of a discharge without cause, for he proceeds under the tenure act to Which such demand does
not apply.
The facts in City Council of ,tugusta v. Killcbrew ' were that the petitioner was elected city attorney in January, 1940. The city adopted an ordinance requiring the city attorney to devote -his time exclusively to city
matters, to keep open an office to be furnished him in the city hall from
9 A.M. to 5 P.M., and cutting off his allowance and reducing his salary to
$100 a month. The city attorney immediately treated his contract of employment as breached, withdrew from his employment and brought action
against the city, alleging the facts above outlined. He further alleged
that the action of the council in discharging him was the result of a conspiracy of eight members of the council to dislodge him for political reasons; that as soon as he was gone, they employed another with the same
emoluments who assumed office as acting city attorney and was never required to move his office to the city hall nor to give iphis private practice;
that ten months or so later the defendant city repealed the said ordinance
andrestored the office of city attorney to the identical position it held when
occupied by the petitioner; and that the petitioner was not discharged for
cause, nor had he received any notice of hearing. Defendant demurred on
the grounds that the petitioner affirmatively caused it to appear that he
voluntarily gave up his office. The demurrer was overruled on appeal, the
court holding that the cause of action was based on an amendment to the
charter of the city, known as the Augusta Officers' and Employees' Tenure
Act, 73 providing that permanent employees shall be removed or discharged
for specified reasons only, which specification includes discourteous treat72. 81 Ga. App. 86, 58 S.E.2d 252 (1950).
73. Ga. Laws 1937-38, pp. 938-943.
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ment of the public, violations of the law, etc. Section io thereof provides:
"Nothing herein shall restrict the rights of city council dioses to bona fide
abolition of an), position held by any permanent employee or other emplovee, provided, however, that if abolition of position is resorted to as a
subterfuge to discharge such employee, he shall have action therefor as
for breach of contract." Section i i provides in part: "No permanent employees shall be discharged, demoted, or suspended for any political belief
or failure to vote in any particular way."
From the petition and amendment in exhibit, it appeared that Fulcher
received the salary petitioner had. No attempt was made to fill the office
on a full-time basis at $IOO a month (as noted above, Fulcher was made
"special" city attorney) ; and it is hard to believe that the defendant actually thought it had secured a competent full-time attorney at that price. Further, under the original contract, the plaintiff was to retain his private
practice and receive funds for office help and expenses, "and the deprivation of these items, being unreasonable in their nature, was a breach of
the contract of employment amounting to abolition of the office." Such
abolition is permissible under the statute unless resorted to as a subterfuge
to discharge the employee. Where it is not alleged that an employer failed
to act in good faith, an action will not lie. In the present case, this was
alleged as a conclusion based upon the facts that a majority of the members conspired together to oust the plaintiff because of his political faith;
that two of the members informed him of this and requested his resignation; that this was repeated and ratified by a majority of the council; that
the office was surrounded by restrictions which made it impossible to fill
the same; and that immediately thereafter another office was created which
contained the same duties and the same pay as the one attempted to be
discontinued. Such allegations made out a cause of action on the ground
that the city council resorted to a subterfuge to oust the incumbent. The
court said that the plaintiff was under no duty to continue in office to
mitigate his damages, because he was not required to do so under Section
1o of the tenure act; and if he had done so he would therefore have
admitted the existence of the office and waived his right to claim a higher
rate of pay than that named for the office.
Defendant further contended that since the plaintiff did not file a written demand with the clerk of council for an investigation and a written
statement of the charges against him, as provided by the tenure act, the
action of the city council was binding upon him and his right to a trial
thus waived. The answer, to the mind of the court, was that no charge
was made against the plaintiff. Interestingly enough, the defendant still
further claimed that the plaintiff's right of action was against Fulcher and
not against the city, upon the principle stated in Mayor of Savannah v.
Monroe { "Where a person entitled to hold an office in a municipal corporation has been wrongfully deprived thereof and the salary of the office
has been received by a person who has de facto held the office, although
not entitled thereto, the right of action of the de jure officer to recover
such a salary is against the usurper and not against the municipality." But,
here, the plaintiff's cause of action was based on the tenure act which
gives a cause of action against the city.
74.
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